Locus standi, or standing, is a common law construct designed, in the public interest, to regulate the flow of litigation in both the private and
The matter of standing of private parties to take public law issues to court is more complex than the issue of private law standing, which by contrast is conceptually self-regulating 7 . By definition, administrative or constitutional law issues affect the public interest or the collective interest of a large number of persons. The conduct of an administrative tribunal or the constitutionality of legislation, moreover, are not obviously affairs which, by their nature, are readily disposed to private inter partes settlement or resolution.
Who is so specifically and amply interested, not to mention financially robust, to bring the question to court, since these cases are only rarely referred 8 by governments themselves for judicial vetting ? This article reviews the very generous common law 9 indulgence of Canadian courts within the last twenty years to hear and adjudicate these cases, even when brought by individuals with little more than ideological or general commu-7. One should not confuse the concept of public law standing with an application for the more limited intervenor status, which many representative bodies might also wish to make in appropriate circumstances. In the Supreme Court of Canada decision of Canadian Council of Churches, supra, note 2, Cory J. described the parallel interests in balance, at 207 : « Yet the views of the public litigant who cannot obtain standing need not be lost. Public interest organizations are, as they should be, frequently granted intervener status. The views and submissions of interveners on issues of public importance frequently provide great assistance to the courts. Yet that assistance is given against a background of established facts and in a time frame and context that is controlled by the courts. A proper balance between providing for the submissions of public interest groups and preserving judicial resources is maintained. » This passage was expressly approved in Rudolph v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, (1992) 139 N.R. 233 at 235, which allowed the League for Human Rights of B'nai Brith intervenor status in an immigration case. 8. Pursuant to the Judicature statutes in each jurisdiction. 9. The distinction drawn here is judge-made rules versus statutory parameters for standing.
This article will analyze only the former category. With respect to the latter class, statutorily-derived standing, it is clear that legislatures are today more active in promulgating permissive criteria for standing, particularly for environmental and planning decisions. Consider, eg. the expansive rights of appeal for «any person who considers himself aggrieved » (emphasis added). Even in that case, the court will not read such standing as entirely subjective and open-ended. It will interpret the section to apply to « any person who reasonably considers himself aggrieved » (emphasis added) : Friends of Toronto Parkland v. Toronto (City), (1991) 6 O.R. (3d) 196 (Div. Ct.) . nity interest 10 . It is submitted that this liberal policy on public law standing was grounded on the absence of a coherent theoretical framework, a desire not to bury facially-significant public law questions in threshold technicalities of standing and ajudicial acceptance, or resignation, of the role of courts to «hear and decide» such questions as they arise 11 . However, stung by mounting backlogs, Canadian courts are closing the doors on public interest standing.
Despite the retreat, persons with common economic, social or political interests continue to assemble for power in collectives to better facilitate the vindication of their common interests. These representative bodies, often separate legal entities, charged with the responsibility of serving the various interests of their memberships, will often find themselves in a position to bring a public law issue to court on behalf of their members.
This article considers whether representative bodies constituted to protect the interests of their members in any economic or socio-political sector can per se assert standing where those interests of their members are affected. An example might be a case where a certain sector, such as liquor The general rule in this court is that a successful party recovers costs on the usual partyand-party basis. That was the rule applied by the courts below. My colleague [La Forest J.] proposes an award of solicitor-and-client costs extending to the courts below. I see no ground for our suggesting they were in error, and I see no ground for our departing from our own general rule. Public interest groups must be prepared to abide by the same principles as apply to other litigants. Were we to produce special rules for such litigants, we would jeopardize an important principle : those undertaking litigation must be prepared to accept some responsibility for the costs. I see nothing here to justify calling upon the taxpayers to meet the solicitor-and-client costs of this party. Vancouver, 1994 , pointed to the increasingly-important role of the courts as independent arbiter between governments and governed and the task of judicial law-making within that realm. She writes at p. 1.1.03 : «Resolving disputes is still the primary and most fundamental task of the judiciary. But for some time now, it has been recognized that the matter is not so simple. In the course of resolving disputes, common-law judges interpreted and inevitably, incrementally, with the aid of the doctrine of precedent or stare decisis, changed the law. The common-law thus came to recognize that while dispute resolution was a primary task of the judge, the judge played a secondary role of law-maker, or at least, law-developer. » outlet licensees or expropriated landowners, are of the view that the tribunal which adjudicates their interests is biased, or that the governing legislation is unconstitutional. Each member ofthat group regulated by the legislation and the tribunal's authority would clearly have standing to challenge the legislation and tribunal. Nevertheless, each member may choose not to do so for a variety of reasons. These reasons include, but are not limited to, the expense, time and the unwelcome negative public relations occasioned by litigation. The last reason may be particularly germane at a practical level if that member has an ongoing relationship with the same regulators. The member's association, on the other hand, may have the resources, and indeed a private mandate of a contractual nature, to address such an issue. Moreover, as an entity, it would not be constrained by any direct relationship with the regulator or other third party.
The history of public law standing in Canada is outlined. It has been an evolution from rigid narrow rules to a broad and flexible approach and, more recently, back to restraint 12 . The legal criteria for standing generally are now described with a view to formulating a proposition about the status of representative bodies to challenge public law processes. This article concludes that the present law is in transition. Standing will depend upon ripeness of the issue, the extent of factual presentation and other formalities.
Origins and Legal Basis of Standing
Historically, only the Attorney-General enjoyed standing to question a public right. The Attorney-General could bring an action by his or her own motion or on behalf of a citizen who expressed a concern. The Attorney-General had unfettered discretion to take up a challenge or decline to do so. The private party therefore lacked control to bring a public issue before the court. In Ware v. Regent's Canal Co., Chelmsford, L.C. stated 13 :
Where there has been an excess of the powers given by an Act of Parliament, but no injury has been occasioned to any individual, oris imminent and of irreparable consequences, I apprehend that no one but the Attorney-General on behalf of the public has a right to apply to this Court to check the exorbitance of the party in the exercise of the powers confided to him by the Legislature.
InBoyce v. Paddington Borough Council 14 , an exception was quarried from the harshness of this rule. Now a plaintiff would be allowed to sue without joining the Attorney-General. Buckley J. summarized:
A plaintiff can sue without joining the Attorney General in two cases : first, where the interference with the public right is such that some private right of his is at the same time interfered with [...] and, secondly, where no private right is interfered with, but the plaintiff, in respect of his public right, suffers special damage peculiar to himself from the interference with the public right 13 .
These Boyce exceptions were adopted in Canada rather recently and now form the first criterion of a three step test to establish standing 16 . In Cowan v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.
11 ', Schroeder J.A. described this direct interest requirement in the following terms :
A plaintiff, in attempting to restrain, control or confine with proper limits, the act of a public or quasi-public body which affects the public generally, is an outsider unless he has sustained special damage or can show that he has some special interest, private interest, or sufficient interest 18 . devolved from the Attorney-General to a party who can display a « genuine interest » in the substance of the public concern.
Contours of the Canadian Law of Standing

The Supreme Court of Canada Trilogy
Thorson
Thorson brought an action seeking a declaration that the Official Languages Act 22 and certain appropriation statutes providing money to implement the Official Languages Act were ultra vires the Parliament of Canada. The Attorney-General refused to act on behalf of Thorson, so he brought the action in his own name.
The Supreme Court of Canada held that the plaintiff had locus standi, notwithstanding that the interest claimed was nothing more than that of a mere taxpayer. While Thorson was not directly or personally affected, he was, in the Court's discretion, an interested party. Due to the declaratory nature of the Act, there was no person or class of persons who were directly affected and who could challenge its constitutionality. Laskin J., as he then was, speaking for the majority, in granting standing, noted that 23 :
[...] it would be strange and, indeed, alarming, if there was no way in which a question of alleged excess of legislative power, a matter traditionally within the scope of the judicial process, could be made the subject of adjudication.
McNeil
After the film Last Tango in Paris was banned by the Nova Scotia Censorship Board, the editor of a newspaper sought a declaration that the Theatres and Amusemenss Act 24 , which created the Board, was ultra vires the province. Citing its own rationale in Thorson, the Court held that the plaintiff had standing even though he was no more affected by the ban than any other member of the public. Laskin, C.J.C. concluded 25 :
The challenged legislation does not appear to me to be legislation directed only to the regulation of operators and film distributors. It strikes at the members of the public in one of its central aspects.
In my view, this is enough, in the light of the fact that there appears to be no other way, practically speaking, to subject the challenged Act to judicial review, to support the claim of the respondent to have the discretion of the Court exercised in his favour to give him standing. The Court had, in fact, recognized that the businesses specifically regulated by the Act were more directly affected but nonetheless decided to award standing to a member of the public 26 . Thus, this decision represented a further relaxation of standing constraints. Certain laws, in their general application to all subjects in the jurisdiction, « directly affected » them and, although the effect was not necessarily acute, standing to as conferred. Nevertheless, the complainant still had to demonstrate some nexus between his or her own freedom and the impugned government action. It is implicit that « personal interest » can be one constituent of a « genuine interest ».Borowski, however, also showed that an interest could be «genuine» (and standing would lie), even if it was not essentially « personal ». If a party can prove either of these interests exist, then a court can grant that party standing to bring forward a purely public matter 29 . This appeal raises the question whether a private individual has standing to sue for a declaration that certain payments out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund of Canada are illegal on the ground that they are not made in accordance with the applicable statutory authority. More specifically, the question is whether a recipient of provincial assistance to persons in need, who claims to be prejudiced by certain provisions of the provincial legislation respecting such assistance, should be recognized as having standing to seek a declaration that payments by the federal government to the provincial government of contributions to the cost of such assistance, pursuant to the Canada Assistance Plan, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-l (hereinafter referred to as «the Plan»), are illegal, as being contrary to the authority conferred by the Plan, because the provincial legislative provisions complained of do not comply with the conditions and undertakings to which the federal cost-sharing payments are made subject by the Plan 36 .
Borowski
In addition to the Borowski criteria 37 , Le Dain J. asked whether « the court ha on what is essentially a public interest in the legality of the federal cost-sharing payments, albeit that of a particular class of the public defined by the Plan as persons in need. » As for public or genuine interest, id., at 335, Le Dain J. had little trouble concluding that the appellant did indeed have a genuine interest both as a member of the public and more specifically as a member of a class of persons intended to have the benefit of the Plan. The Court adopted the passage of Thurlow C. In reaching this conclusion, the judicial concerns involved in this extension were examined. The most important consideration was the requirement of a « serious issue as to validity ». In otherwords, in primafacie cases, the benefit of the doubt should favour adjudication. The Borowski standards would adequately address legitimate concerns favouring restraint : [...] the concern about the allocation of scarce judicial resources and the need to screen out the mere busybody ; the concern that in the determination of issues the courts should have the benefit of the contending points of view of those most directly affected by them ; and the concern about the proper role of the courts and their constitutional relationship to the other branches of government. These concerns are addressed by the criteria for the exercise of the judicial discretion to recognize public interest standing to bring an action for a declaration that were laid down in Thorson, McNeil and Borowski* 2 .
The result of this decision brings the criteria for standing within the administrative context. Any party who can meet the three-part Borowski test can challenge a board or tribunal's acts and decisions 43 . eluded and excluded and the proper identification of class members. Representativeness is a prerequisite to class actions as a means to ensure that the class action procedure itself is effective. Multiplicity of actions, civil process and other administration of justice issues are other factors which weigh prominently in application of the rules.
Representative standing here has a peculiar focus on the mischief that inheres in permitting a party once removed from a direct interest in the subject matter to merely raise and argue the issue and have it decided. It is an inquiry as to who puts the objective matter of validity of government action before ajudge. Once done, the result is a public result, binding upon all to whom the law applies 50 .
How, therefore, should representativeness relate to public law standing ? It is submitted that representativeness is not, and should not be, a critical factor on the basis of law. The outcome of the action applies to all members of the public equally and specialized facts are not in issue. Legal accountability of the applicant representor is minimal. In other words, if a statute is found ultra vires the legislature, how important is it to that result that the person bringing the question to court was not the most representative of the persons «directly affected»? Even most governments, at certain points in their mandates, and members of any court would encounter problems if they had to demonstrate that their actions accurately represented the interests of their constituents.
Messrs. Thorson, McNeil, Borowski and Finlay were not found to be in any way representative of taxpayers or citizens in their respective challenges to legislation, but ostensibly represented only private idiosyncratic interests. A motivated association, likewise, should not have to establish its credentials as to representativeness. Standing for them resided in that each personified a « directly affected » member. They ostensibly represented no one else. By contrast, representative bodies derive their legitimacy by the pre-qualification of representing others, which is the source of their « direct » or « genuine » interestt It would be a grievous miscalculation to devise a test where the extent of representativeness possessed by the organization is calibrated or scrutinized in each case. If some representativeness is demonstrated in order to establish «genuine interest», a court should not look further and deny standing on the basis that it could have been greater. That would be tantamount to a quantitative inquiry into the minds of Messrs. Thorson, 50 . On the other hand, the rules pertaining to class actions are parallel and instructive. If one accepts the need for the presumption of statutory validity and the reality of limited public resources to pass on constitutional and administrative law questions, some measure of motivating self-interest must be built into standing, as it is with class actions.
McNeil, Borowski and Finlay to determine how resolutely they held their respective opposition to government action. A minimum standard of representativeness would only serve to create a new ground to justify the denial of standing according to the superfluous impressions of the presiding judge. It would be a most unruly horse 51 . Evaluating the quality and quantity of representativeness will inexorably lead to impossible considerations about the age of the representative body 52 , its objects 53 , and formality 54 .
Normative judgments about what is « representative » or « not representative » can and will lisue ffom all lidee of any factual constellation. A representativeness test is also likely to be fraught with practical difficulties of proof. In the absence of reliable qualitative evidence, the exercise may quickly reduce to a nominally quantitative one that is subject to manipulation and arbitrary standards.
There is some direction in the case law toward proof of representativeness as a condition to standing 55 . These judicial detours do not serve to dispose of the issue. This trend is, one respectfully submits, an unsatisfactory development for the reasons offered above.
Serious Issue as to Validity
Whether there exists à « serious issue of invalidity 56 » is one that every party seeking standing must meet. It addresses government objections that 51. Per Sir James Burrough in Richardson v. Mellish, (1824) 2 Bing. 252: « Public policy is a very unruly horse, and when once you get astride it you will never know where it will carry you. » 52. Compare a long-standing organization with one which has recently come into existence. 53. For example, the reason the organization was created. Does it exist to protect in a general way the interests of its members, or is the body charged primarily with managing the public law issue specifically at hand ? Was it born of the public law concern in issue ? 54. Is the body incorporated, adequately financed and enduring or more loosely-constituted ? 55. An example is Energy Probe, supra, note 29. Carthy J.A. notes the eminence of individual scientists who joined the action and even one individual described as « a symbolic representative of the generally affected public » at 533 : « When I see serious individuals, such as the appellants in this case, presenting concerns that are of fundamental significance to all citizens, I have no hesitation in concluding that this is not an abuse of the public interest exception, but rather tends to serve it. » See also The exercise of judgment can be somewhat circular, akin to discretionary granting of leave to appeal. This is because the court must hear enough of the issue and argument to determine whether it has indeed a serious chance of success. The practice of hearing the entire case before pronouncing on standing is not widespread to date 66 . However, it may become the common method of dealing with standing cases which are otherwise close to call 67 . Occasionally an appeal to a superior court will be framed in terms of specific questions, the first being standing and the remainder being substantive. It is not unusual in that case for the reviewing court, especially where the lower court did so, to pass judgment on the merits of the case before specifically turning to standing 68 .
The more the explicit determination of standing is postponed in a case, the more it has evaporated as a specific or dispositive issue in that case 69 . Other factors such as the actual merits of the case and other judicial interest and preoccupation with it are more likely to determine the standing question than the tests for standing themselves.
Genuine Interest
A representative organization will encounter the task of showing a «genuine interest » in the subject matter of the action. It usually will not have any since it is personally removed from the subject matter. Instead, it represents a group, one presumes, of «genuinely interested» legal persons. It has an interest, if not a duty, to do that well. That is its interest : to vindicate the « genuine interests » of its membership.
66. The approach has been used in the past. See, eg. the comments of Duff J. in Smith, supra, note 18, at 194D.L.R.,338(S.C.R.): « we are loath to give ajudgment against the appellant solely based upon a fairly disputable point of procedure ; and, accordingly we think it right to say that in our opinion the appellant's action also fails in substance ». 67. This was the view of Laskin C.J.C. who wrote the unanimous opinion in McNeil, This article has so far defined the « genuine interest » of the nominal applicant, the representative body, as one which is derived vicariously from its corporate objects and contractual mandate. The court can view a representative body as the voice of its members, treating the body as it would one of its members. This conceptual model for representative standing may be fashioned from simple agency principles. The representor may be seen to possess lawful agency authority to efficiently and directly represent a number of «directly affected » parties. It is, accordingly, the particular interests of the individual members which are being litigated, and not those of the representative organization itself. 
No Other Reasonable and Effective Manner to Bring the Issue to Court
This requirement can theoretically pose a special problem for representative associations. Often any member of the group would be under no substantive disability to bring the matter before the court itself.
Is this, however, a « reasonable and effective » alternative ? If cost, time or estrangement of the working relationship practically rules out the individual member bringing the issue to court, giving standing to the trade association may be the only « reasonable and effective » means to adjudication. The «reasonable and effective manner» is a highly and, one might propose, deliberately vague qualification for standing, but nevertheless the one which « lies at the heart of the discretion to grant public interest standing 76 ». It may be invoked to thwart the exasperating litigious ambitions of the mere «busybody 77 ».
If an applicant can demonstrate some serious approach to the issue, a substantive connection with it, and a realistic probability that no one else will pursue the matter 78 , this test will likely be satisfied.
Representative bodies are usually under legal and contractual responsibility to their members. By clothing them with an economic or political interest, they should not be found in the realm of « busybody ». That they are assigned or delegated the task of bringing and sustaining the action on behalf of the members is an answer to whether there is another reasonable and effective manner of doing it. 76 . Hy andZel's and Magder, supra, note 31 at 662. 77. The term belongs to Thurlow C.J., supra, note 37, but was adopted by LeDain J. ] can be determined in a judicial proceeding when the federal AttorneyGeneral has declined to Act ? » And at 15 : « II those eases where the restrictive erinciple of requiring carriage of the suit by the Attorney-General and denying any suit if the Attorney-General refuses to act, has been cast aside, the rationale of the ratepayer's action has been explained in various ways, dependent, it seems to me, on the factual situation in the particular case. » See, also, McNeil, supra, note 20 at 634-35. Per Laskin C.J.C. for the court :
[McNeil] also requested the Attorney-General to refer the constitutionality of the provincial Act to the Appeal Division, but was unable to elicit any affirmative or negative response to his request. Indeed, in correspondence with the respondent's counsel, counsel for the Attorney-General took the position that the Act was intra vires and there appeared to be no right in the respondent to attack its validity. Thereafter, the respondent brought his application for a declaration. In my opinion, the respondent took all steps that he could reasonably be required to take in order to make the question of his standing ripe for consideration. The Supreme Court of Canada thus resisted hearing an organization when directly-affected parties were actually already bringing forward the issue 93 . There may, however, been factors, other than judicial resources, which were responsible for the denial of standing in that case. One that went unacknowledged was that the Council was primarily established to represent the interests of churches, not refugees. It had effectively volunteered this advocacy function on behalf of a defined group, and did not hold any specific formal mandate of representation 94 . Another was the political manner in which this challenge was mounted. The Court referred twice to « the fact that the action was brought on the first working day following the passage of the legislation » by a group which had just earlier tried to influence the legislators 95 .
Applied and followed recently by the Supreme Court of Canada in
It is clear that Canadian Council of Churches does not advance the position of public interest litigants
96 . Its scenario is, nevertheless, distinguishable from the truly representative body composed of directly-affected parties and which organization is mandated to bring the action on their behalf, not in duplication of their efforts.
The distinction between an organization whose purpose includes serving directly-affected parties and one whose membership is also composed of them may now be decisive to the issue of public law standing. Such a distinction may have a valid claim to recognition so that, for example, the first category of representative group should never attain standing while 92. The Court rejected the proposition that refugees, as a group, suffered disadvantages that stood in their way to effective access to court. Further, the possibility of 72-hour removal orders depriving refugee claimants of constitutional arguments was not material. The Court pointed out that, in practice, these orders would not normally be enforced with that effect. See, dicta of Cory J. at 205-207. It would be important to observe how many of these refugee appeals referred to actually experienced the full range of constitutional argument and appeal, which process could have a major impact on the numerous administrative appeals the Court used to justify the denial of standing. the second might do so automatically or as a matter of judicial discretion. Alternatively, the claim could be made that the second category should always have standing while, in the case of the first category, it should depend on judicial discretion.
Standing for Representative Bodies in Light of Recent Case Law
In addition to the judicial decisions described above, a number of others are useful in illuminating the generally uneven application of the trilogy principles in the name of discretion.
Rafferty Alameda \. Saskatchewan
The courts have exhibited flexibility when granting a representative body standing, finding « genuine interest » in a variety of ways. It is clear from the decision in Finlay that this court, in its discretion, may recognize that a private citizen or a group of citizens or a society has « public interest standing » to bring an action for declaratory relief, even in regard to an administrative action, which is challenged on non-constitutional grounds.
Airport Taxicab v. Canada
The representative body in Airport Taxicab (Malton) Association v. Canada (Minister of Transport) et al. 102 represented various taxi and limousine companies. It objected to the regulations imposed by the Minister of Transport on the flow of taxis and limousines into the Toronto International Airport. Any individual company belonging to the Association could have challenged the regulation because each was directly and personally affected by it. The Trial Division of the Federal Court of Canada, emphasizing its discretionary power, granted the Association standing using the Borowski principles 103 :
The second procedural item concerns the defendant's argument that the plaintiff association lacks status to commence this action. The defendant argues that although the individual shareholders and members of the plaintiff association which is an incorporated body have a direct interest in the taxicab and limousine permit system controlled by the defendant, the corporation itself, that is Airport Taxicab (Malton) Association (the plaintiff named herein), does not.
I do not deny that the defendant's argument in this respect may have more than a little merit. However, jurisprudence on the question of standing, especially the decisions of [sic] Supreme Court of Canada [...] lead me to the conclusion that when the constitutional validity of legislation is being challenged, as is this case, the according of status to commence an action for declaratory relief is largely within the discretion of the Court...
I am satisfied therefore that in the interest of justice the plaintiff should not be denied standing.
Friends of the Island Inc. v. Canada
The party pressing the action Friends of the Island v. Canada (Minister of Public Works) 104 was a public interest organization whose members were « farmers, fishermen, ferry workers and environmentalists resident in Prince Edward Island 105 ». The government had argued that the coalition 101. Id., at 13. did «not establish the requisite interest because it filed no material to establish its corporate objects or interest. The interests of its members or shareholders cannot be taken to be the interest of the applicant 106 . » Reed J. in the Federal Court disagreed 107 :
There is abundant evidence establishing their [members'] individual interests. In my view, as I read the material which has been filed, there is also evidence that the objects of the corporate applicant, include, if not solely relate to activities directed at opposing the construction of the bridge. In my view, the applicant has proven that it has sufficient interest 108 ...
While this case is under appeal 109 , the matter of standing is not likely to radically change. The Supreme Court of Canada recently applied it 110 .
Conseil du Patronat v. Quebec
The most influential case of standing for representative bodies is Conseil du Patronat du Quebec Inc. v. Quebec (Attorney-General) 11 .. A non-profit corporation, the Conseil du Patronat, that represented many employers' federations and management associations. It sought to mount a Charter challenge of the provisions of the Quebec Labour Code, which prohibited the hiring of replacement workers during a strike 112 . The Conseil employed 15 persons, none of whom were unionized. There was clearly, therefore, no direct personal interest on the part of the Conseil in the validity of the labour legislation. The Quebec Superior Court denied standing on the bases that neither « l'intérêt suffisant » nor actual and exceptional prejudice to the Conseil were demonstrated. The Quebec Court of Appeal, Chouinard J. A. dissenting, dismissed the appeal by the Conseil x13 .
106. Id., at 734. 107. Id., at 735. 108. A further argument that the FederalCourt Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7, as amended by S.C. 1990, c. 8, s. 18.1(1), which accorded standing only to persons «directly affected by a matter in respect of which relief is sought » precluded standing, was also rejected by the trial judge. The Conseil du Patronat in its application described itself as :
a non-profit corporation formed to promote the economic, social, and professional interests of 131 Quebec employers' federations and associations, as well as the interests of a large number of businesses which support it, representing about 70 % of the province's active labour force 114 .
Moisan With respect, I believe that requiring actual direct interest (or at the very least potential interest) for action in private law is incompatible with interest in matters of public appeal, involving the constitutionality of a statute. For example, any employer (even an employer with only one unionized employee) is deemed to have sufficient interest to challenge the constitutionality of the « anti-strike-breaking » law, but the Conseil du Patronat is denied the same right, even as an employer, although its purpose is to promote the interests of a very large number of employers or firms, a majority of whom appear to be unionized. That is not how I interpret the Supreme Court decisions [...] .
Since the Conseil du Patronat speaks for its members, surely it has just as much interest as each of its members does.
Efforts by the representative body to resolve the issue before resorting to litigation will be evidence of whether another suitable means could be invoked to bring the matter to court. One of the factors Chouinard J.A. thought was germane to standing was that :
the Conseil du Patronat complained unsuccessfully to the Quebec Human Rights Commission [...] even asking the Attorney-General (on May, 1984) to take the issue before the Court of Appeal. Was this sufficient to come to the reasonable conclusion that there were no other suitable means of bringing the matter before the courts? It seems to me that the answer must be yes" 8 .
Chouinard J.A. concluded that « since the Conseil du Patronat speaks for its members, it must have just as much interest as each of its members 
Hi-Fi Novelty v. Nova Scotia
The Nova Scotia distributors of coin-operated gaming machines to convenience stores, taverns, arcades and hotels were members of the Nova Scotia Music and Amusement Operators Association. The provincial government had decided to regulate video gambling. These distributors, as a result, lost money. The Association challenged the provincial video gambling regulations. The application, Nova Scotia Music and Amusement Operators Association v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General)*
25
, was dismissed for lack of standing. The chambers judge found no merit in the constitutional question and accordingly, citing Canadian Council of Churches, saw no serious issue of invalidity presenting. He was also concerned that standing would fortify the distributors' criminal behaviour and that standing should be denied in such circumstances : This is not a criminal prosecution nor a criminal application, however, the evidence clearly indicates that the conduct of the applicants based on a civil burden of balance of probabilities indicates criminal conduct.
The chambers judge was also convinced that the matter would sooner or later come to court again by way of a defence to a prosecution under criminal or regulatory legislation. This court has said on several occasions that it will not interfere with a discretionary order, particularly an interlocutory one such as this, unless wrong principles of law have been applied or a patent injustice would result. Simply because we may possibly have reached a decision contrary to that of the judge on the facts is not sufficient. The burden on the appellant is heavy [...] In our opinion, the appellants have failed to show that the chambers judge made any error of law or that any patent injustice arose from the decision which he has reached.
This decision exemplifies the disquieting practice of hoisting locus standi on its own petard. If there is any sign that the declaratory judgment is still alive in Canadian law, it is difficult to envisage how these applicants did not have standing to pursue one. To make a decision on the merits, in effect, and then to ostensibly refuse status is to denature the concept and purpose of standing.
Coalition of Citizens v. Metropolitan Authority
A regional authority was charged to develop a solid waste management system. It sought public input and eventually approved a plan that called for 40 per cent waste incineration. Several individuals objected to this and formed the coalition which in turn commenced an action for a declaration that this decision contravened sections 7 and 15 of the Charter and two related provincial statutes. In Coalition of Citizens for a Charter Challenge v. Metropolitan Authority 12 *, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal eventually decided, in a judgment 129 released one day after the Hi-Fi Novelty case above, that the coalition did not have status.
The Court viewed the public environmental assessment hearings as an essential process to the ripening of this action. It found, therefore, by temporal impediment, there was not a serious justiciable issue to be tried. The outcome of the public hearings might render the action unnecessary. At the minimum, it would likely focus the issues since the original claim was in the nature of a wide-ranging attack on incineration generally.
While the Court may not have been implicitly in favour of the composition of, and approaches taken by, the Coalition, it's concern expressed was about duplication and effective use of resources 130 : 126. Hi-Fi Novelty Co. et al. v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General), (1994) The voluminous material before us on this very small segment of the dispute (relating to standing) shows very clearly what a massive undertaking this litigation would become. The attitude of the parties revealed through the materials tendered, and the manner in which the case has been argued on their behalf, indicates that co-operation will be at a minimum. To one with even the slightest familiarity with the process of the courts and the time consumed in litigation, it is clear that this case shapes up as promising to be one of the most complex, expensive and time-consuming civil trials in the history of this province-if it is allowed to get off the ground. The numerous discovery proceedings, interlocutory motions with possible appeals therefrom and case management meetings can be all too easily visualized.
Hy and Zel's and Paul Magder Furs Ltd. v. Ontario
The Supreme Court of Canada's more technical focus on «other reasonable and effective manner», prominent in Canadian Council of Churches, continued in this case 131 . The two corporate applicants and some of their employees applied for a declaration that the Ontario Retail Business Holidays Act 132 , which mandated the closure of their stores on certain days of the year, was unconstitutional as violating religious and equality rights under the Charter. These applications were initiated in response to the Attorney-General's motion for orders requiring these stores to close on a holiday. The court was willing to assume, without deciding, that corporations can enjoy such rights, but noted that none of the appellants had alleged infringement of their own particular rights. court's ability to consider standing at the outset « depends on the nature of the issues raised and whether the court has sufficient material before it, in the way of allegations of fact, considerations of law, and argument, for a proper understanding at a preliminary stage of the nature of the interest asserted. » Since the appellants' case has proceeded without trial, the situation is akin to determining standing as a preliminary point. » This rationale is clearly flawed. If standing is not raised in early court applications and decisions are rendered, even without a full trial, it must be implicitly ceded. If the court is concerned with effective utilization of judicial resources, one must question the wisdom of denying standing in a reasoned judgment at the level of the Supreme Court of Canada in favour of another more « reasonable and effective manner of bringing the issue before the court ».
meriting that Magder had « worn a wide path to the courthouse over the past 10 years' 36 », Major J. pointed out that the bar to standing was high for civil applicants seeking declaratory relief by alleging a Charter infringement 137 :
The appellants have brought civil applications for declaratory relief. A party's ability to attack a legislation's constitutional validity on Charter grounds is more difficult to establish in a civil suit than in a criminal prosecution.
He then applied the trilogy tests. A serious issue as to validity was made out by virtue of the amendments to the legislation since its constitutionality was confirmed in J?, v. Edwards Books & Art Ltd. 138 . The appellants were directly affected because they were specifically subject to prosecution under the impugned statute.
The parties failed on the inquiry as to whether « other reasonable and effective » means existed of bringing the matter to court. However, the precise reasons are not clear. Major J. suggests that it may be because « almost no original evidence in support of their claim 139 » was presented. Presumably he was motivated by judicial fondness for a clean and comprehensive prosecution file where private standing to defend on constitutional grounds would be assured.
Deficiency of evidence is a foreseeable defect of the summary procedure followed in this case. One might question the use of standing principles to kill consideration of this action's merits on that ground alone 140 . His Lordship further found that, unlike in the circumstances of Borowski, the legislation in question « does not discourage challenge 141 » which is to say that the legislation is not « immunized » from iit Nevertheless, ,t is difficult to conceive of a substantially more « reasonable and effective » means of bringing this issue to court once it was actually before the court, having found that the litigants are directly affected and that there is a serious issue as to validity.
In what could be the most serious blow to public law standing was the following statement of the 145 and would have granted standing on the basis that these appellants suffered exceptional prejudice due to the special effect of the legislation against their interests. The affected parties were before the court, in an existing controversy and it should have been resolved to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings 146 .
Conclusion
Public interest standing has been described, with some justification, as « one of the most criticized aspects of constitutional law 147 ». The various discretionary prescriptions which have evolved since Thor son suffer from the problem of fusing together. Judges continue to disagree on their content 148 and application. Judicial analyses provide little guidance to parties and courts alike. Discrete, but misleadingly simple, terms such as « specially affected », « extraordinary prejudice » and « genuine interest » may no longer dominate the analysis, but the hoary replacement, judicial discretion, is hardly an improvement.
The golden age of liberal public interest standing is plainly gone. It is difficult to imagine the courthouse gates being ever again opened as wide as they were during the apogee of Borowski, even though Laskin C.J.C. was already by then sounding the floodgate alarm 149 . Even Conseil du Patronat and Canadian Council of Churches are hard to reconcile, though they were decided a scant six weeks apart 150 . Suddenly the standing dialectic is to be decided on the minimalist grounds of whether government action is « immunized » from challenge and how overworked the judges are.
The restraint began with Canadian Council of Churches, which is now invariably cited to justify refusing standing. When the highest court in the land tells refugees that they must themselves litigate the constitutionality of their legal proceedings, one can hear the doors closing on public interest litigation. Starting with this case, the Supreme Court of Canada shifted the emphasis from the control of abuse of process to control of courthouse backlogs.
This has continued with tighter standing restrictions being currently defended on the additional rationale of the need for a full factual matrix upon which to frame a substantive adjudication. This is evident in the dicta of Major J. in Hy and Zel's and Magder 151 : [.. .] the court's vigilance [is] in ensuring that it hears the arguments of the parties most directly affected by a matter. In the absence of facts specific to the appellants, both the court's ability to ensure that it hears from those most directly affected and that Charter issues are decided in a proper factual context are compromised 132 .
The lack of a concrete factual context is a circumstance which virtually always attends, and has always attended, by its very nature, public interest litigation. To turn away cases lacking a specific factual basis is The result is an expectation-indeed a demand-from the public as a whole or from important interest groups within the public, that the judge has properly considered all the factors relevant to his decision and its consequences.
As society becomes even more complex and spawns more regulation, which in turn calls for more judicial review, it is clear that anticipatory and declaratory judgments will be more elusive in Canada. These kinds of judgment can economize on judicial resources, by virtue of their preven- The effective use of resources test does not advance standing analysis. It is always open to assert that the court could better spend its time on other things. If this concern was permitted to control the negotiation of what cases are heard, courts would never feel moved to grant standing in public interest cases. Certainly periodic judicial workloads cannot be the determining factor in which such cases get standing.
The conservation of judicial resources rationale in foreclosing standing may also itself be based upon a false economy. To decide standing first at the appellate level, to adjudicate on the merits and then refuse standing, to demonstrate variable degrees of respect for original discretion, to deny standing on the basis of incomplete pleadings or factual presentation, to encourage multitudes of fragmented, personally-affected parties to navigate the waters of countless administrative and constitutional cases to present the invalidity question while at the same time hurling the representative dossier out of court-these actions will not promote the most effective use of judicial resources. Public interest litigation is arguably among the most effective use of resources.
A cynic might suggest that the new found discretion and workload has actually played out in the selection of cases according to the political proclivities of judges. In the tone of several of the more recent judicial decisions, the configuration and modus operandi of the applicants may have been the determining factors as to standing. As tests are refined and formulated, it is submitted that discretion will follow impressions. Declaratory Judgments, 2nd ed. (1941) , at 27 : « no « injury » or « wrong » need have been actually committed or threatened in order to enable the plaintiff to invoke the judicial process ; he need merely show that some legal interest or right of his has been placed in jeopardy or grave uncertainty, by denial, by the existence of a potentially injurious instrument, by some unforeseen event or catastrophe the effect of which gives rise to dispute, or by the assertion of a conflicting claim by the defendant ».
as to affirm a provincial tax on alcohol 156 or the validity of the criminal sanctions against assisted-suicide 157 , standing was not even raised as an issue.
An action launched by a truly representative body, unlike for statutory standing, intervenor status and class actions is a special transaction because it raises public law questions and because it does so for members who are interested. To see it as a party directly affected by the outcome of the action depends upon one's perspective and abiding willingness to receive the issue for adjudication 158 . The classification of such actions distinguishing them from others has not been done to date in Canada, with the result that each case may be considered as unnecessarily crowding the docket. There is good legal principle in notions of « genuine interest » and agency to grant standing. There is also sound public policy in the forms of convenience, finality and avoiding a multiplicity of proceedings to justify standing to a representative body to raise public law questions as a matter of course. Collectivities may also be seen to have a more legitimate claim to standing as representatives of the public interest than individuals.
Public interest standing in Canada, which started with Thorson has truly come full cycle in 20 years with the decision of Hy and Zel's and Magder. Browsing the law reports today, one observes that representative bodies are still getting into court to have their concerns adjudicated. Many « Friends », « Associations » and « «oalitions s »ases sd oot even nncounter the issue by way of defence. The most recent appellate pronouncements may change that.
As a threshold matter, nevertheless, public interest standing needs to be clarified. As Sharpe has stated 159 :
Enlargement of standing is an important part of the recognition of the enhanced role of the courts brought about by the Charter with all the difficulties this entails. Liberalized standing, no longer tied to traditional legal interests, will allow de- Borowski had no direct or future contingent interest in the abortion issue other than as a citizen with an interest in constitutional behaviour. Would his status have been differently considered if he had presented himself in the role of « Borowski Inc. », a non-profit organization devoted to issues related to abortion laws ? I think not, and furthermore, if in this case it was decided that the individuals have status but the corporations do not, it would be a disservice to the purpose of the [public interest] exception in effectively bringing significant issues before the court, by depriving one side of the litigation of the expertise and resources needed to assure effective presentation. » 159. R.J. SHARPE, Charter Litigation, Toronto, Butterworths, 1986, p. 25. veloping interests a voice of their own in the discussion about the appropriate solution to the problem at hand. Deciding which of these interests should be recognized in any particular circumstances will not be easy. What is essential is that they not be turned aside only because they appear very different in form and in substance from those long cherished by the law.
While standing is intertwined with the role of Canadian courts and the scope of judicial review, the examining of public law in its current social context has indeed become a perilously indeterminate exercise. In the words of Lamer, C.J.C.
160 :
I sometimes think of these sorts of cases as being somewhat like a spider's web. If you pull on one strand of the web, the entire structure moves, but not necessarily all in the same direction [...] The implications are widespread and, at times, hard to foresee.
Containment of public interest standing, as one of those strands in the web, may have considerably unintended social implications. The more daunting challenge may be to avoid getting caught in the web and consumed by the spider.
